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Explaining the Original Understanding of Lopez to the 
Framers: Or, The Framers Spoke Like Us, Didn’t 
They?  
Conrad J. Weiler, Jr.∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
The power to regulate commerce is one of the most far-reaching 
of Congress’s powers. Not only was a power over commerce one of 
the chief goals of the Framers,1 but, especially since the 1930s, it has 
been the primary basis of a vast array of domestic legislation.2 This 
domestic legislation in turn has rested in large part on the Supreme 
Court’s acceptance of a broad definition of the power to regulate 
commerce among the states.3 But because commerce is largely 
private sector activity, it is also regulated by state governments in 
their own capacities to regulate commerce as well as under their 
general police powers over health, safety and welfare of their people. 
Thus, national regulation of commerce frequently triggers federalism 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Political Science, Temple University (weilerc@temple.edu). 
 1. On this point virtually all of the legion sources on the Framing agree. See, e.g., MAX 
EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 87, 220, 222 (2003); THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 
49 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., Liberty Press, 2001); 
ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (7th ed. 1991); CATHY D. MATSON 
& PETER S. ONUF, A UNION OF INTERESTS: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN 
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 2, 90–100 (1990); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO 
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 98 (1985) [hereinafter NOVUS 
ORDO]; CURTIS P. NETTELS, THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL ECONOMY 91 (1962); 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 119–20 (14th ed. 
2001); Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does 
the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 756 (2003). 
 2. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 119. 
 3. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 119, 145, 148; 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 814–15 (3d ed. 2000); Choper, supra note 1, at 731–32; 
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: An 
Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 795, 800 (2003).  
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issues.4 For nearly sixty years after the 1937 Jones & Laughlin5 
decision, the Court rejected virtually all federalism-based challenges 
to a broad congressional application of the power over commerce 
among the states. This allowed Congress to broadly address domestic 
issues such as civil rights, employment rights, environmental 
controls, organized crime, age discrimination, discrimination against 
people with disabilities, and many others, without requiring that the 
regulated activity be itself commercial, only that it “affect 
commerce” in some degree.6 
However, in the 1995 decision United States v. Lopez,7 the 
Supreme Court signaled moving towards a jurisprudence of 
originalism while narrowing the reach of the federal power to 
regulate commerce among the states and enlarging the independence 
of the states from federal control. While the change signaled by 
Lopez is not (so far, at least) a complete return to pre-Jones & 
Laughlin jurisprudence, it is now clear that the era of broad 
congressional action in domestic policy, regardless of effects on 
states, justified by a broad “affecting commerce” rationale is over, at 
least until there is a significant change in the Court’s membership. 
Since Lopez, the Court, by the same five-to-four majority, has only 
struck down one other law directly based on the narrow definition of 
commerce in Lopez.8 But the Court has also either struck down or 
narrowed the effect of several other laws passed under the earlier, 
more expansive view of what could be regulated as affecting 
commerce because they transgress the inherent immunity of states by 
allowing citizens to sue states for violation of federal laws.9 The 
 4. RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE 
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 322 (5th ed. 1999). 
 5. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 6. Justice Breyer noted that “Congress has enacted many statutes (more than one 
hundred sections of the United States Code), including criminal statutes (at least twenty-five 
sections) that use the words ‘affecting commerce’ to define their scope.” United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 630 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also TRIBE, supra note 3, at 812–
15. 
 7. 514 U.S. at 558–68. 
 8. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating part of the 1994 
Violence Against Women Act allowing women to sue attackers under federal law for gender-
based violence, because gender-motivated violence is not economic in nature nor does it 
substantially affect commerce). 
 9. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina, 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
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narrowing of the power over commerce in Lopez and an enlarged 
sense of the inherent attributes of sovereignty of the states, together 
with greater respect for “traditional” state activities, and narrowing 
the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Section Five enforcement 
powers of Congress constitute what has been called the Rehnquist 
Court’s “New Federalism.”10  
An important part of the Court’s rationale in Lopez, and other 
“new federalism” decisions, is a sense that they are returning to the 
original meaning of the Constitution. We are aware that there may be 
differences between the Framers’ intent and the original 
understanding of the meaning of the Constitution when it was 
adopted. The discussion here will not enter into the debate over the 
methods and propriety of originalism, nor is it necessary.11 What we 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that power to regulate commerce among the states, based 
upon the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, cannot abrogate states’ sovereign immunity, 
and allowing state employee to sue for age discrimination); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999) (extending state’s sovereign immunity to suit in its own courts for violation of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that Trademark Remedy Clarification Act cannot abrogate states’ 
sovereign immunity by allowing private suit for trademark misrepresentation); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating commerce-clause-based provision of Brady Handgun 
Control Act requiring local police to do background checks on prospective gun purchasers); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (barring commerce-power-based suit 
against state for failing to negotiate with Indian tribe under Indian Regulatory Gambing Act). 
Since several of the laws struck down as infringing on inherent state sovereignty were also 
based on the power over commerce, the narrowed power over commerce stemming from Lopez 
reinforces the effect of the expanded state sovereignty notion. 
 10. See THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz 
ed. 2002) for a recent critique of the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism,” especially his 
chapter on “The States’ Rights Assault on Federal Authority.” See also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Have the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions Increased Liberty?, HUM. RTS, Fall, 2002, at 
3. Others argue that the actual impact of Lopez itself has been benign, see Rotunda, supra note 
3, at 795–96, small, see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: 
The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 
1253, 1262–66 (2003); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and 
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2003), or mixed, see J. Mitchell Pickerill, 
Leveraging Federalism: The Real Meaning of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Jurisprudence 
for States, 66 ALB. L. REV. 823, 824–29 (2003). The Court’s “New Federalism” may restrain 
Congressional power over commerce among the states but does not seem to have extended to 
the power to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes, Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of 
Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and 
Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1–2, 4 (2003), or to the power to regulate foreign 
commerce, Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of 
Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1166–67 (2003).  
 11. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
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do here is to focus narrowly on one aspect of Lopez’s connection 
with the Framing era, which is to consider whether there is semantic 
continuity between key words of the Lopez holding and words the 
Framers and Americans of their day would have used; or, in other 
words, to perform a kind of reverse textualism and see how the 
Framers would have understood Lopez.12 After examining the 
meaning of key words in the Lopez holding and what they meant in 
the eighteenth century, we conclude not only that neither the Framers 
nor any American of their day would have understood Lopez to have 
anything like the meaning intended by the Lopez majority, but 
because of changed meanings of language the Framers would likely 
have violently rejected the literal holding of Lopez. We conclude by 
considering what this repugnancy between the language of Lopez and 
the language of the Framers means for the originalism of Lopez, its 
overall intelligibility, and the regulation of commerce.  
I. UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ 
Lopez dealt with the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199013 
(GFSZA), enacted under the power to regulate commerce among the 
states. The GFSZA made it a federal crime to have a gun within one 
thousand feet of a school.14 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion striking down the GFSZA held that Congress had exceeded 
its power to regulate commerce among the states because the GFSZA 
regulated activity—having a gun near a school, which was in itself 
not at all economic—and because this activity did not substantially 
affect commerce among the states. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained 
that the Act was problematic for several reasons. First, it regulated 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) for the fullest discussion. 
Throughout this article the term original understanding will be used to refer to the meaning the 
Constitution was thought to have by Americans, including the Framers, at the time of its 
adoption. 
 12. We will provide evidence both of the words of the Framers and of the more general 
usage of the word in question, but since we conclude that there are no differences between the 
Framers’ usage and the more general usage of the words that we examine here, we simply call 
the words in question “the Framers’ words.” 
 13. Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 1484 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25)–(27), 
922(q)(2)–(4), 924(a)(4) (2000)). 
 14. §§ 921(a)(25), 922(q)(2)(A). 
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education, one of the most traditional of all state activities; thus, it 
invaded the Tenth Amendment powers of the states. Second, the Act 
lacked both congressional findings and a jurisdictional element 
connecting possession of guns near schools to commerce among the 
states.15 
Few people would have strongly defended the GFSZA as vitally 
necessary to improve American education, and the Court might have 
rejected the GFSZA on narrower grounds, such as the other problems 
of the GFSZA referred to by Chief Justice Rehnquist.16 Instead, 
however, the Lopez majority chose to redefine the criteria for 
congressional regulation of commerce among the states in two ways. 
 First, no previous cases have explicitly held that the activity to be 
regulated must itself be “economic” in nature. Admittedly, though the 
Court did not define “economic,” many of the Court’s cases 
upholding a broad commerce power over the previous decades dealt 
with activities that might have been regarded as “economic,” and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion relied on this factual 
characteristic to justify this part of the Lopez holding: “Even Wickard 
[v. Filburn],17 which is perhaps the most far reaching example of 
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved 
economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school 
zone does not.”18 Wickard involved a challenge to a fine imposed 
because of the refusal of Filburn, a dairy farmer in Ohio, to limit his 
1941 wheat production to a quota of 223 bushels assigned him under 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act.19 The purpose of that Act was to 
raise depressed agricultural prices by limiting supply through 
production quotas.20 Instead, Filburn harvested an extra 239 bushels 
beyond his quota, claiming that he sold only some of his wheat, using 
the rest for his livestock, seed, and personal consumption.21 Despite 
 15. 514 U.S. 549, 559–64, 567 (1994).  
 16. See generally Mark R. Killenbeck, Madison, M’Culloch, and Matters of Judicial 
Cognizance: Some Thoughts on the Nature and Scope of Judicial Review, 55 ARK. L. REV. 901 
(2003). 
 17. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 18. 514 U.S. at 560. 
 19. 317 U.S. at 113–15.  
 20. Id. at 115. 
 21. Id. at 114. 
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Filburn’s argument that his wheat was neither in commerce nor 
among the states, and hence beyond federal regulation, the Court 
sidestepped these issues and upheld his fine on the basis of the fact 
that “wheat consumed on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the 
scheme of regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and 
obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased 
prices.”22 Wickard, in other words, allowed regulation of purely local, 
non-commercial activity that had a substantial effect on commerce 
among the states under an “aggregation” principle.23 But Chief 
Justice Rehnquist transformed the broad holding of Wickard into a 
limitation on the power over commerce by arguing that the activity in 
question, even if local and non-commercial, was nonetheless still 
“economic,” and then making the economic character of the intrastate 
activity in question a requirement for regulation.24 However, as 
Justice Breyer’s Lopez dissent pointed out, the Court in previous 
cases had never explicitly required that the activities to be regulated 
had to be “economic” in nature, so that this part of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s Lopez holding does not follow any previous holding of 
the Court and is a deliberate narrowing of the regulation of commerce 
from where it stood under Wickard.25 Moreover, it is unclear how this 
will affect the aggregation principle.26  
Second, the Lopez Court determined that in order to be regulated 
by the power over commerce among the states, an “intrastate” or 
“local” activity must substantially affect commerce.27 This explicit 
requirement of the “substantially affecting” test made it more 
difficult to regulate activity under the power over commerce, 
 22. Id. at 129. 
 23. Using numerous activities which themselves may be neither commercial nor “among 
the states,” but which collectively may have a substantial impact on commerce among the states 
as a legal basis for invoking the federal power to regulate commerce among the states, has been 
called the “aggregation” principle, and was the basis of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and most 
modern federal environmental and criminal legislation. Lopez, 514 U.S at 616 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); see also Choper, supra note 1, at 743–46.  
 24. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, 567. “[A]s Wickard and later cases make clear, there is no 
requirement that the activity regulated be commercial or economic.” Donald H. Zeigler, The 
New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1395 (1996). 
 25. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 26. Id.; see also Choper, supra note 1, at 743–46. 
 27. 514 U.S. at 559. 
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because, as Chief Justice Rehnquist himself conceded, some previous 
cases had allowed a more lax “affecting commerce” test.28  
This dual narrowing of the power to regulate commerce among 
the states, at least for activity found to be neither “commercial” nor 
“among the states,” raises questions about the continued viability of 
much domestic federal legislation dealing with the environment, 
racial or gender discrimination, discrimination against people with 
disabilities in private employment and public accommodations, or 
other areas where the activities in question may not seem clearly 
“economic in nature,”29 nor to “substantially affect” commerce. 
Lopez challenges the power over commerce for not only future 
legislation, but also areas of federal law now thought to be fully 
established. In addition, by giving itself the power to define what is 
“economic,” in addition to what is “commerce,” Lopez revived the 
specter of the Lochner v. New York and United States v. E.C. Knight 
Co. era, when the Court actively enforced its own definition of 
“liberty of contract” to limit state economic legislation and applied 
arbitrary distinctions such as that between manufacturing and 
commerce, and effects on commerce that were “direct,” as opposed to 
“indirect,” to limit use of the federal power over commerce.30  
II. LOPEZ AND ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING  
A strong element of the majority’s decision in Lopez, as well as of 
its closely related federalism jurisprudence, is the claim that by 
limiting the power over commerce they are turning toward, if not 
fully restoring, the original understanding of the Constitution.31 
Justice Clarence Thomas has been the Court’s most explicit advocate 
for the view that the years since 1937 have seen the Court stray far 
from the original understanding of the Framers in the regulation of 
 28. Id. In dissent, Justice Breyer suggested a “significantly affecting commerce” test. Id. 
at 615–16 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 630–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 30. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1904); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 
U.S. 1 (1894); PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998). 
 31. See David M. Sprick, Ex Abundanti Cautela (Out of an Abundance of Caution): A 
Historical Analysis of the Tenth Amendment and the Continuing Dilemma Over “Federal” 
Power, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 529, 556–71 (1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p163 Weiler book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 16:163 
 
 
 
commerce. This view is becoming influential in some lower federal 
courts32 and also has some academic support.33 Justice Thomas’s 
concurring opinion in Lopez is perhaps the fullest statement of his 
position: “At the time the original Constitution was ratified, 
‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as 
transporting for these purposes. . . . . As one would expect, the term 
‘commerce’ was used in contradistinction to productive activities 
such as manufacturing and agriculture.”34 Justice Thomas then quoted 
three dictionaries from the founding era in support.35 Next, Justice 
Thomas asserted that to include the term manufacturing in the 
commerce power would lead to regulating manufacturing “with 
foreign nations” and “with the Indian tribes,” which “does not make 
sense as a matter of intent or as a matter of plain common sense 
English.”36 Justice Thomas also pointed out that Alexander Hamilton 
used the terms “commerce,” “agriculture,” and “manufacturing” to 
refer to distinct activities.37 Justice Thomas next disagreed that any 
“affecting commerce” or even a “substantially affecting” commerce 
test was intended by the Framers.38 Finally, giving bite to his views, 
Justice Thomas suggested that he would like the Court to return to the 
original understanding of the Framers regarding commerce.39 Justice 
Scalia did not offer a separate opinion in Lopez, but is a strong 
advocate of textualism, adherence to meaning of the words of the text 
of the Constitution when it was adopted.40  
 32. See David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court’s Rediscovery 
of the Tenth Amendment, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 339 n.194 (1996). 
 33. Reviewed briefly infra at note 65. 
 34. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585–86 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 587. 
 37. Id. at 586. 
 38. Id. at 588–89. 
 39. Id. at 589. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Lopez does an excellent job 
of reviewing the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, though we argue that his opinion, 
ironically, ultimately falls into the same trap as the pre-1937 Court. On the use and pitfalls of 
using dictionaries, see Samuel A. Thumma and Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has 
Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 
227, 264–74 (1999). 
 40. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A Comparative 
Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1187–88 (2003); see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
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The concurrence in Lopez by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice 
O’Connor, was more willing to accept some accommodation with the 
Framers’ original understanding regarding the regulation of 
commerce. Kennedy implicitly accepted that “the economic system 
the Founders knew”41 was simpler than today’s and that regulation of 
commerce was intended to be narrower at that time, but that for the 
sake of “stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence”42 they 
would not return to “an understanding of commerce that would serve 
only an eighteenth century economy.”43 They asserted that the course 
of the interpretation of the power over commerce since the Framing 
has been less than consistent because “neither the course of 
technological advance nor the foundational principles for the 
jurisprudence itself were self-evident to the courts that sought to 
resolve contemporary disputes by enduring principles.”44 They 
concluded that “Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on 
the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to 
build a stable national economy.”45 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor seem to differ from Justice 
Thomas not so much in their view of the Framers’ understanding of 
the power to regulate commerce, but in the rigidity of their 
commitment to originalism.46 They seem to be saying that while they 
tend to agree with Justice Thomas’s assertions of the narrowness of 
the Framers’ understanding regarding the regulation of commerce, 
they would accept a more flexible Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
that would evolve to meet the needs of our modern economy, needs 
the Framers did not anticipate. Their concern in Lopez seemed to be 
less with defining the Framers’ understanding regarding the power 
over commerce than with staking out barriers to protect federalism.47 
Perhaps because of these differences within his majority, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Lopez literally avoided the issue of the 
 41. 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 574. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 568. 
 45. Id. at 574. 
 46. Id. at 568–83.  
 47. Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional 
Power Under the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 235–38 (1996).  
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original understanding of the Framers regarding the regulation of 
commerce, finding merely that the power to regulate commerce—
whatever commerce may mean—requires that activities be economic 
in themselves and that they “substantially affect” commerce before 
they come under the sway of the federal commerce power.48 
However, his general appeal to “first principles,”49 suggests a return 
to the Framers’ “original understanding,” and his holding moves the 
law towards Justice Thomas’s position. On the face of it, though, the 
Kennedy-O’Connor “evolutionary” viewpoint and the Rehnquist 
“substantially affecting local activities economic in nature” test 
portray themselves to be moderate, middle of the road approaches 
that accept the need to take reasonable, but limited steps beyond the 
narrow, outmoded understanding of the Framers.  
In contrast, however, we think that the main purpose of the power 
over commerce was to create a national single market and a stable 
national economy. Clearly, the Framers could not anticipate the 
specific changes in technology, markets, consumer demand, theories 
of how best to produce national wealth, the size of the country, or 
other factors relating to commerce, but they fully expected general 
technological change as well as westward growth. The Framers 
anticipated that the power over commerce would be broad enough to 
deal with these changes and their effects. Further, we think that the 
Framers fully expected that the power to regulate commerce could 
extend to manufacturing as well as agriculture, mining, forestry, 
fishing, and transportation when such activities were not purely local 
and affected the larger production of national wealth, and that the 
power over commerce was expected to extend to any other activity 
that affected larger commerce not otherwise barred by the 
Constitution.50 If we are correct, the Lopez holding is not a 
reasonable, middle-of-the-road holding, but a narrowing of the power 
over commerce that the Constitution originally provided. 
However, the challenge we make here to Lopez’s originalism does 
not require broad discussions of the Framers’ understanding 
 48. 514 U.S. at 559–60, 567. 
 49. Id. at 552–53.  
 50. Evidence for these assertions, including the author’s own Lexis survey, will hopefully 
be available soon as a book. 
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regarding the power over commerce, or even a conclusion that they 
intended a broad power over commerce. For this article we focus on 
the implications for Lopez of changes since the Framing in the 
meaning of three key words in the Lopez holding: “economic,” 
“substantially,” and “affect,” though we will also briefly consider the 
meaning of “commerce.”  
III. THE MEANING OF “ECONOMY” IN 1787 
Lopez requires that activities to be regulated under the power over 
commerce must be “economic” in nature.51 By economic, the Court 
presumably means the modern sense of having to do with the national 
system of production, distribution and consumption of wealth, goods 
and services.52  
In 1787 the word “economy” had the opposite of this modern 
meaning. We start with Dr. Johnson’s 1765 dictionary, simply to 
begin the discussion, not because any dictionary is first in authority in 
defining constitutional meaning. Johnson defined “oeconomy” as: 
“(1) management of a household, (2) frugality, (3) disposition or 
regulation, (4) a system of motions.” He provided no entry for 
“oeconomic,” but we assume that this adjectival form of the noun 
“oeconomy” would have had the same core meaning.53 There was no 
usage at that time of the word “economy” or its then more common 
variant, “oeconomy,” which corresponded to our modern meaning of 
“economy.” The modern sense of “the economy” did not emerge 
until the latter part of the nineteenth century with the emergence of 
economics as a separate academic discipline and was not commonly 
used until the early twentieth century.54  
Examples of the use of the term “economy”55 in the first two 
senses defined by Dr. Johnson, and primarily as “frugality,” abound 
 51. 514 U.S. at 559–60, 567. 
 52. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 58 (John 
Eatwell et al. ed., 1987). 
 53. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 501 (Barnes & Noble 
Books 1994) (1756). Nor was there an entry for “economy”—the classical diphthong still 
prevailed. 
 54. 3 PETER GROENEWEGEN, THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 905–
06 (John Eatwell et al. eds, 1987). 
 55. We will henceforth use the modern spelling except where we are actually quoting a 
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during the Framing era in a wide range of discussions of what today 
we would call public finance, economics, and public policy generally. 
For example, the British Privy Council and Board of Trade routinely 
reviewed colonial legislation for conformity with the colonial charter, 
British commercial regulations, and conformity to British law 
generally. When these agencies found no such interference worth 
dealing with they would often allow the colonial laws to stand as 
dealing with “domestic” or “internal oeconomy.” There was no 
bright-line test for what type of colonial laws might fall into these 
categories: they were essentially residual categories, corresponding to 
matters in principle not excluded from the power of the colonial 
government which did not offend British trade interests, or other 
principles of British law, or which Britain felt could not be enforced 
in any case.56 We believe there was continuity between most British 
colonial meanings and those of the Framers in the area of regulation 
of trade, and that the word “economy” in the context of the regulation 
of commerce denoted activities left to the colonies or states for their 
own internal governance—analogous to activities the Tenth 
Amendment is thought to have reserved to the states.57 
For example, in 1775 the Privy Council reviewed twelve 
Pennsylvania acts dealing with relieving debtors, creating a new 
county, issuing bills of credit, suppressing disorderly discharge of 
guns, inspection of salt fish for export, selling land, regulating the 
assize of bread, erecting a new jail, and appointing wardens for the 
port of Philadelphia. The Council allowed the acts to become law 
because they were “passed either for the purposes of internal police 
and economy, or for the relief of insolvent debtors . . . .”58  
Further, Sir James Steuart in 1767 defined the term “oeconomy” 
as “the art of providing for all the wants of a family, with prudence 
and frugality.”59  
writer who used the diphthong. 
 56. ELMER BEECHER RUSSELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY 
THE KING IN COUNCIL 224–27 (Columbia University 1915).  
 57. See infra Part V, “THE MEANING OF ‘AFFECT’ IN 1787,” for the discussion of 
how the internal affairs of the states related to those things which affected commerce. 
 58. 8 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682 to 1801 app. XXXII, at 
650 (1902) [hereinafter PA. STATS., 1682–1801] (emphasis added). 
 59. SIR JAMES STEUART, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
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Closer to home, on the eve of the Convention, Tench Coxe 
addressed Dr. Franklin and others gathered in Franklin’s Philadelphia 
home on the commercial system needed for the United States. 
Speaking of credit, Coxe said: “The restoration of public credit at 
home and abroad should be the first wish of our hearts, and requires 
every oeconomy—every exertion we can make.”60 Clearly Coxe was 
using the term “oeconomy” with Dr. Johnson’s second meaning, 
frugality. In Convention, George Mason of Virginia attempted to 
encourage “oeconomy frugality and american manufactures [sic].”61 
In various Federalist papers, Hamilton used the word “economy” in 
the same sense of “frugality.” In No. 22, for example, Hamilton wrote 
of the requisition system as an obstacle “to an economical system of 
defence” and as being “unfriendly to economy and vigour.”62 No. 13 
followed a discussion of revenue and is subtitled, The same Subject 
continued, with a view to Economy.63 The meaning is explained in the 
first two sentences: “As connected with the subject of revenue, we 
may with propriety consider that of economy. The money saved from 
one object, may be usefully applied to another . . . .”64 Examples of 
“economy” as “frugality” abound in the ratification debates as well. 
Clearly, the use of “economy” or “economic” to denote local or 
household management or frugality was well established in the 
colonial era and continued into (and well past) the time of the 
Framing, generally as well as in the context of regulation of 
commerce.  
The change in meaning of “economy” to its modern sense only 
well after the Framing era is confirmed by examination of the use of 
the term by the Supreme Court itself. The author’s survey of the use 
(1767), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS: POLITICAL, METAPHYSICAL & CHRONOLOGICAL OF SIR 
JAMES STEUART 1 (Augustus M. Kelley 1967). 
 60. TENCH COXE, AN ENQUIRY IN THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH A COMMERCIAL SYSTEM 
FOR THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE FOUNDED 49 (photo. reprint, Am. Imprints) (1787). 
 61. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 606 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) 
[hereinafter RECORDS] (emphasis added). The connection among these seemingly disparate 
goals is the widely held belief that promoting American manufactures would reduce wasteful 
spending on British manufactures. 
 62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 105–06 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & 
James McClellan eds., 2001) (emphasis added). 
 63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 13 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
 64. Id. at 60 (emphasis added). 
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of the term “economy” in all the recorded opinions of the Court 
shows that the term “economy” was used in dozens of cases going 
back to the 1790s, but primarily with the meaning “frugality,” or as 
part of the more commonly used term “political economy.” It was 
also sometimes used in the sense of management of household or 
domestic economy. There were only two uses of the term in the 
nineteenth century possibly in our modern sense, one in 1869, one in 
1884, and only three others before 1935. Only in the middle of the 
epic battle between FDR and the Court over the constitutionality of 
his New Deal programs passed under the power over commerce did 
the Court begin frequently to use the term in its modern meaning, 
though it has not completely dropped the other meanings.65 
As a result of the dramatic change in the meaning of the term 
“economy” after the later 1800s, the Framers would have been 
shocked by the “economic in nature” test of Lopez. Even the most 
ardently nationalist Framers would have understood “economy” to 
include what was not within the regulation of commerce among the 
states, i.e., “the management of a household,” the “internal or police 
affairs of a state,” or less shocking, but also less intelligibly, 
“frugality.”66 They would have understood these terms as extending 
national power into state and personal affairs beyond what even 
Britain only incompletely did, yet provoked a revolution. In a word, 
the Framers would have understood this part of Lopez to do exactly 
the opposite of what the Lopez majority claim they are trying to do: 
protect first principles of federalism.  
 65. The study is still incomplete, but a list of cases is available from the author or easily 
reproduced. A total of 1045 cases used the term “economy” since 1790. Out of a total of 105 
cases using the word “economy” before 1900, there were only two modern usages before 1900 
and only three more before 1935, but the term was used in 822 cases after that, primarily in the 
modern meaning. We found no usage of “oeconomy,” but perhaps this is because the diphthong 
was converted to an “e” by Lexis. 
 66. The term “economy” is still widely used in the second sense of “frugality”—for 
example, we frequently refer to “economical” shopping or shoppers. The meaning of 
“management of a household” is probably now obsolete, though it still survives in high-school 
“home economics” courses. 
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IV. THE MEANING OF “SUBSTANTIALLY” IN 1787 
The second part of the Lopez test requires that intrastate activities 
to be regulated under the power over commerce also “substantially 
affect commerce.” As with the term “economy,” the Lopez Court 
seems also to have employed these words in a modern sense not used 
in 1787. Starting with “substantially,” the Court in Lopez obviously 
employed the term in the modern sense of “amply” or “in 
considerable amount,”67 because the term is chosen after a long 
discussion by Chief Justice Rehnquist about the degree to which 
activities should be connected to commerce in order not to intrude on 
the reserved powers of the states.68  
But in 1787 “substantially” usually meant “real” rather than 
“amply.” Dr. Johnson’s dictionary says: “In manner of a substance; 
with reality of existence. . . . Strongly; solidly. . . . Truly; solidly; 
really; with fixed purpose . . . . With competent wealth.”69 
Admittedly the second meaning of “strongly” or “solidly” is closer to 
the “considerable” meaning used in Lopez, but it is difficult to 
confirm which meaning the Framers would have gleaned from Lopez 
because from what we have seen of writings of the time there was 
virtually no usage of this term relating to the regulation of commerce, 
trade and navigation. We think this is partly a result of the fact that 
“affect” was rarely used with any modifier in the late eighteenth 
century, a point to be discussed next, and partly a result of the fact 
that the meaning of “with reality of existence” was the predominant 
one. Therefore, people writing about trade matters, especially 
merchants, lawyers, or seasoned political activists such as the 
Framers, were not likely to use the term “substantially” to confirm 
that they actually meant what they were saying. This would be like 
adding the word “really” to statements made today to emphasize that 
they were true. Probably for the same reason, the term was rarely 
used by the Court itself until recent decades. For example, the Court 
used the term “substantial” only a few times before the late 1800s, 
and never regarding commerce, and used the terms “substantially 
 67. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1897 (2d ed. 1987). 
 68. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1994). 
 69. JOHNSON, supra note 53, at 713. 
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affecting” in only twenty-four cases in its entire history. Moreover, 
the Court used the term “substantially affecting commerce” or 
“substantially affecting interstate commerce” in only thirteen cases, 
and nine of those cases were since 1975.70 
In conclusion, the use of “substantially” to convey a quantitative 
measure is a relatively modern usage that the Framers would 
probably not have understood the way the Rehnquist Court employed 
it in Lopez. The Framers probably would have understood 
“substantially” to have the same meaning as we attach today to 
“substantive,” as in “substantive due process,” meaning “real” or 
“actual” due process, not “a lot of” due process. Thus the Framers 
would have understood the Lopez Court to be saying that “activities 
to be regulated had to affect commerce with reality of existence,” or 
“really” or “truly” affect it, rather than what the Court intended, 
which is that “they have to affect commerce amply or in considerable 
measure.” But even if they had understood it to mean “to strongly or 
solidly affect commerce,” as the next section discusses, this phrasing 
would have been seen by the Framers as redundant, if not unusual, 
since to them the term “to affect commerce” itself already meant “to 
actually affect commerce.”  
V. THE MEANING OF “AFFECT” IN 1787 
In the Framing era the term “to affect,” or variants such as 
“affecting,” was used moderately frequently in discussions of the 
regulation of commerce. However, “to affect,” or its inflections, were 
almost never used as far as we can tell in discussions of the 
regulation of commerce in the Constitutional Convention. Nor was 
“to affect” used normally with an adverbial modifier of any kind, and 
we have almost never found an example of “substantially” or 
“significantly” being used to modify “affect” in the Framing era. As 
 70. All conclusions and data are based on the author’s Lexis searches. The use of 
“substantial” and its inflections seems to have roughly accompanied the rise of the modern 
meaning of “economy” in Supreme Court discourse. Justice Thomas has also noticed that the 
“substantial effects” test is a twentieth century innovation, though in rejecting it as well as the 
“affecting commerce” test, he would presumably disagree with our contention in the next 
section that the latter was the test the Framers intended. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 596 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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far as the author can tell, the term “to affect” was used almost always 
by itself right up to the 1930s in constitutional law discussions of the 
regulation of commerce. For example, the Court used the term “affect 
commerce” in five cases before the Civil War, including several 
times in the first commerce case, Gibbons v. Ogden.71 Yet as shown 
above, the Court did not feel constrained to prefix the “substantially” 
adverbial modifier to the term to limit its extent, until the New Deal.  
Dr. Johnson defined “affect” as “to have an effect on 
something,”72 and this is pretty much the meaning that the term has 
had across the centuries, at least in this context. For example, in 1731 
London merchants complained to Parliament of numerous 
supposedly discriminatory and unfair commercial practices 
committed by most of the American colonies in violation of the acts 
of navigation. A bill was introduced into the House of Commons to 
forbid the colonies from passing any law that would “affect the trade 
or navigation of Great Britain.” This bill provoked considerable 
opposition from the colonies. The Council of Virginia objected that a 
law in “such indefinite terms” would “in effect deprive them of the 
most valuable privilege granted them by the Crown as an 
encouragement to their first settlement,” meaning the power to 
legislate for themselves: 
[B]ecause our whole employment as well as interest bears so 
near relation to our Mother-country, that it will be almost 
impossible to frame any law that may not be construed some 
way or other to affect the Trade or Navigation of Great Britain. 
We can’t, for example, lay any tax for the support of H.M. 
Government: we can’t confine our coopers to a reasonable 
gauge in the setting of tobacco hogsheads: nor can we make 
any provision for the improvement of our staple commodities; 
for preventing the making or false packing of unsound and 
unmerchantable tobacco, pitch and tar; or for the just payment 
of debts in good and valuable commodities (in all which the 
 71. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 72. JOHNSON, supra note 53 (Times Books Ltd. 1983) (1755). 
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interest of the British merchants is equally concern’d with our 
own) without violating so general an Act of Parliament.73  
For example, one of the last reviews of colonial laws was done in 
1773 of thirty Pennsylvania laws passed in March and September, 
1772. The Board of Trade recommended approval of all of them for 
the following reason: 
That as these laws are in their general objects and provisions 
confined to such matters as relate merely to the internal police 
and government of the colony, and do not affect the trade and 
commerce of Great Britain, or the interests or authority of the 
Crown, the said Lords Commissioners see no reason why they 
may not be recommended to your Majesty for 
approbation. . . .74 
A full discussion of this important point is beyond the scope of 
this article, but clearly the “affecting commerce” test has a pedigree 
long preceding the New Deal, and its dangers to local autonomy were 
known long before Lopez. We believe there is ample evidence to 
show that the Framers expected the “affecting commerce” test to be 
part of the power over commerce for legislative or judicial review 
purposes, and to reach matters that were not necessarily commercial 
in themselves. We believe that because of their familiarity with the 
“internal police” or “internal economy” and “affecting commerce or 
trade” concepts utilized in Privy Council review of colonial 
legislation for conformity with British trade interests, the problem of 
balancing the rights and interests of the states against those of the 
new national government in commercial regulation was well known 
to the Framers.75 We believe that, like Britain, the Framers intended 
to regulate whatever activities affected commerce among the states, 
regardless of whether those activities were otherwise part of the 
internal police or internal oeconomy of a state.  
 73. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS, COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1731, 
at 322–23 (Cecil Headlam & Arthur Percival Newton eds., 1938) (emphasis added). 
 74. 8 PA. STATS., 1682–1801, supra note 58, app. XXX., at 597 (1897) (emphasis 
added). 
 75. Following British usage, the terms “internal police” or “internal oeconomy” were 
frequently used as synonyms in the Framing era. RUSSELL, supra note 56, at 224–27. 
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Ironically, the term “affect” is difficult to find in the records of the 
Convention or ratification, and especially difficult to find with a 
modifier. Roger Sherman of Connecticut used it in a proposal, that 
was precisely on point but was defeated, “that no State shall without 
its consent be affected in its internal police . . . .”76 The only instance 
we have found in Framing era documents where “affect” is used with 
a modifier is, oddly enough, in the Constitution itself, where it used 
three times.77 
The Article V language “no amendment . . . shall in any Manner 
affect . . . “ logically means that within the four corners of the 
Constitution, simply “to not affect” by itself might allow some effects 
by certain “manners.” Or, to put it more directly, “to not in any 
manner affect” something means to have no effect of any kind, 
whereas to not “affect” something, might still allow indirect or minor 
effects. Presumably, following British practice, a finding that an 
activity was not “affecting” something such as commerce would still 
have allowed certain minor or indirect effects on commerce by means 
of certain “manners,” or that the decision to do anything about things 
affecting commerce might be discretionary. The phrase “in any 
Manner affect” seems to have had a twofold purpose: first, the very 
fact that it was unusual to modify the term “to affect”78 was clearly 
designed to alert and admonish the country and Congress not to make 
any changes to or affecting these provisions; and second, in fact the 
language itself means to not allow any exceptions at all if it came to a 
test in court. Certainly the critical nature of the bargain protecting the 
slave trade to the entire Constitution supports this interpretation. 
 76. RECORDS, supra note 61, at 630. 
 77. Two instances concern the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: the phrase “all Cases 
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,” appears in Article III, Section 2, 
Clauses 1 and 2. The third instance is in Article V of the Constitution, part of Morris’s fateful 
bargain over the removal of the Navigation Act supermajority requirement in return for 
protection of slavery: “[N]o Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand 
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses of the Ninth 
Section of the first Article [concerning importation of slaves, and proportionate taxation] . . . .” 
The “in any Manner” phrase was inserted at the request of Rutledge of South Carolina, on 
September 10, late in the Convention, and was the result of long and hard bargaining to keep 
several of the southern states in the Union. RECORDS, supra note 61, at 557. For Iredell’s 
explanation in the North Carolina ratifying convention, see 4 PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH 
LERNER, THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 582–83 (1987). 
 78. See supra Part IV. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p163 Weiler book pages.doc  9/23/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 16:163 
 
 
 
Thus, this exception seems to support the general rule that “affect” 
was generally used by itself. 
After ratification, Justices Marshall and Johnson used the 
unmodified phrase “affecting commerce” repeatedly in Gibbons v. 
Ogden, the first Supreme Court case over the power to regulate 
commerce among the states, regarding extent of the power over 
commerce in relation to the powers of states.79 For example, Justice 
Marshall said:  
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, 
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the 
nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States 
generally; but not to those which are completely within a 
particular State, which do not affect other States . . . .80  
We conclude, therefore, that the normal term of relationship of 
activities to the regulation of commerce assumed by the Framers to 
be sufficient to be regulated under the power to regulate commerce, 
with certain exceptions, was that the activities “affect” commerce. 
Thus, the Framers would have understood the Lopez test so far to 
mean that “activities to be regulated under the power to regulate 
commerce have to have the nature of management of a household, or 
frugality, and in reality have an effect on commerce.” In addition to 
violating federalist principles, this phrasing is somewhat 
unintelligible. It should be apparent that whatever definition of 
“commerce” is now plugged into this phrase, the result will still 
violate federalist principles because of the “economic” problem. 
However, the meaning of “commerce” and “economic” are related, 
so let us very briefly review some aspects of the meaning of 
“commerce.” 
VI. THE MEANING OF COMMERCE IN 1787 
Ironically, for all the importance of the meaning of the term 
“commerce” to federal power,81 the Court has never attempted to 
 79. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).  
 80. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).  
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.  
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definitively define it. Nor does the Lopez Court attempt to define it, 
despite its importance in applying the Lopez test.82 But for the 
purposes of this article, it is actually not necessary to arrive at a 
particular definition of “commerce”: any definition of “commerce” 
leads to absurd results as the Framers would have understood Lopez.  
To briefly review the history of attempting to give meaning to this 
term, the Framers did not define commerce. At the Convention, they 
never actually had a general discussion of the reach of the power to 
regulate commerce, but only discussed it in connection with 
particular problems related to commerce. Consequently, our insights 
into the meaning of the power over commerce from the Convention 
derive mainly from debates over federal export taxes, state import 
and export taxes, port preferences, state inspection and tonnage 
duties, and whether a supermajority would be required to exercise the 
power. Moreover, the power over commerce was also little discussed 
in the ratification conventions, the Federalist papers, or in any 
writings of the time. Thus, the Framers’ understanding of this power 
must be inferred from indirect discussions in Convention and other 
materials.  
Since the 1930s a number of major attempts have been made to 
arrive at a sense of the Framers’ understanding, with varying 
conclusions. The earlier literature from the 1930s to the 1960s, takes 
generally the viewpoint that the Framers intended a broad power over 
commerce.83 More recently, although Nelson and Pushaw have found 
 82. For a fuller discussion of the importance of the lack of definition of this term in Lopez, 
see Choper, supra note 1, at 731–93. Space also prohibits consideration of the meaning of “to 
regulate” which we think also implies broad authority to make commerce conform to a plan 
determined by Congress, including acting upon things not themselves commercial. 
 83. Perhaps the first is Stern’s 1934 article, arguing that the Randolph Plan proposal to 
give Congress power over all matters in which the states were separately incompetent signaled 
a broad power over commerce. See Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More 
States than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1335–66 (1934). Corwin also wrote a lengthy 
defense of a strong power over commerce. See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE 
POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS (1962) (preface dated 1936). Hamilton and Adair wrote a more 
comprehensive review. See generally WALTON H. HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE 
POWER TO GOVERN: THE CONSTITUTION—THEN AND NOW (1937). Frank Bourgin’s brief but 
incisive work comes to largely the same conclusion. FRANK BOURGIN, THE GREAT 
CHALLENGE: THE MYTH OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1989) (not published 
until 1989 though researched before 1945). Then there is the massive work by Crosskey. See 
generally WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1953). While a mine of data and insights into the Framing era, it has been 
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historical evidence for a broad power over commerce,84 other 
research has tended to support a narrower view of the power over 
commerce.85 
It is beyond the scope of this article to enter into detailed 
discussions of these works or to enter into the evidence for our own 
conclusions regarding the power over commerce. Here it is enough to 
show that the eighteenth century meaning of “economic” as 
“frugality” or “management of a household” makes any meaning of 
“commerce,” whether broad or narrow, lead to absurd results as the 
Framers would have understood the Lopez formulation. Under the 
narrow, Thomasian definition of commerce as limited to buying, 
selling, barter and transportation, the Lopez holding becomes: “the 
power to regulate commerce covers activities with the nature of 
management of a household, or frugality, and which truly have an 
effect on buying, selling, barter and transportation.” Under the broad 
definition of commerce as having to do with the earning of specie in 
foreign trade for the purpose of national wealth, or with any gainful 
activity, in the Framers language Lopez would read: “those activities 
may be regulated under the power over commerce which have the 
nature of management of a household, or frugality, and which 
actually affect the production of national wealth through gain of 
specie in foreign trade,” or “affect gainful activity.” Thus, regardless 
of the definition of “commerce,” the eighteenth century 
“management of a household” meaning of “economy” still takes 
federal power into the most intimate recesses of private activity not 
somewhat discredited because of its gratuitous attacks on Madison, its sometimes extreme 
conclusions, and its generally contentious and difficult quality.  
 84. Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying 
First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over 
Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1999).  
 85. Epstein argued that the Framers intended a very narrow power over commerce. 
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1387–
1455 (1987). Randy Barnett has searched the historical record and concluded that the power to 
regulate commerce was understood at the Framing to be narrow, limited largely to buying, 
selling, and transportation. See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of 
the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001). Our own unpublished research, based 
partly on the experience of British regulation of the colonial economy, supports a broad power 
over commerce.  
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perhaps even left to the states to regulate under their police powers, 
let alone to the federal government.  
VII. THE FRAMERS’ SENSE OF “THE ECONOMY”  
Possibly the Lopez majority selected the “economic in nature” 
criterion in hopes of setting some limits to the power over commerce 
in favor of the states while hoping to avoid the pitfalls of the pre-
1937 “direct-indirect” and “commerce-manufacturing distinctions.” 
Certainly Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, at least, presume that the 
Framers had a sense of an economy, albeit a supposedly simpler one. 
Probably the Court gave no thought to the “management of a 
household” problem of the pre-twentieth century meaning of 
“economy.” Regardless, the changed meaning of this term forces 
Lopez into one of two directions in order to retain its originalist roots. 
Either it must be denied that the Framers and the people of their age 
had any concept approaching our modern sense of “economic,” or of 
“economy,” in which case Lopez’s “economic in nature” test is no 
longer originalist, but an innovation grafted onto the Framers’ 
understanding, which the Kennedy-O’Connor concurrence implies, 
but contradicts Justices Kennedy and O’Connor’s assumption that 
they did have a sense of an economy, or we try to find the term the 
Framers would have understood to express the modern sense of 
“economy”—the comprehensive system of production and 
distribution of goods, services and wealth. 
The first position, that the Framers had no sense approaching what 
we mean today by “the economy,” would make the “management of 
a household” problem of Lopez disappear, but at the cost of 
weakening Lopez’s originalist foundations regarding the power over 
commerce. It would concede that the Lopez “economic in nature” test 
is a modern innovation, added onto whatever narrow scope the 
Framers supposedly understood the power over commerce to be, 
probably that asserted by Justice Thomas. But it would beg the 
question of what larger purposes the Framers thought they were 
serving if they only intended to regulate buying and selling. Be that 
as it may, that the Framers had no sense of “the economy” is difficult 
to maintain. After all, those in Philadelphia were largely 
representatives of the merchant and propertied elite, and many of 
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them and the ratifiers had first-hand experience with the complex 
British mercantile system as colonial lawyers, merchants, or officials, 
or in trying to deal with it in trade after the war.86 Many were likely 
therefore aware of the more than seventy Acts of Parliament since 
1660 as well as the hundreds of decisions of the Privy Council 
reviewing colonial laws and thousands of instructions of the Board of 
Trade all regulating larger scale American productive activities, 
transportation and trade in the narrow sense, and what affected all of 
them, inside the colonies as well as with each other and with other 
parts of the complex transatlantic manufacturing and trading system 
of the larger British empire.87 This system included: 1) bounties for 
American rice, tobacco, naval stores, indigo, lumber, hemp, silk, and 
barrels exported to Britain; 2) enumeration of American tobacco, 
rice, cotton, indigo, fustic, dye-woods, ginger, sugar, barrels, hemp, 
lumber, copper ore, pig and bar iron, naval stores, furs, and other 
products requiring them to be exported only to Britain; 3) 
prohibitions on American hat, wool, iron and steel production and 
discouragement of other American manufacturing that might compete 
with British export manufactures; 4) prohibition of tobacco 
production elsewhere in the empire and support of slavery especially 
to aid Virginia and Maryland tobacco culture; 5)duties on American 
exports abroad as well as to other colonies; 6) rules on which ports 
particular American exports had to go to, and which colonies could 
import certain goods; 7) regulations requiring ships, crews, captains, 
owners, and factors to be British; 8) control over American money 
and laws affecting collection of debt by British merchants; 9) Privy 
Council review of colonial legislation to overturn laws injurious to 
British commerce; and 10) instructions to colonial governors to 
 86. Thirty-four of the Framers in Philadelphia were lawyers, of whom eight dealt 
primarily with foreign or interstate commerce, and ten lived mostly from public office; sixteen 
conducted large scale agricultural operations and thus were certainly familiar with the export 
economy; seven were merchants engaged in commerce; and three were retired and living from 
wealth made in economic activities. FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 86–88 (1958). 
 87. Their awareness is attested to by the widespread use of the term “Navigation Act” as a 
synonym for “regulation of commerce,” as seen by the presence of the former term in the draft 
Constitution itself as an alternative expression of the power to regulate commerce and lengthy 
debates over the requirement of a two-thirds vote to pass navigation acts. RECORDS, supra note 
61, at 183, 374–75, 563, 631–32. 
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prevent American manufacturing or any other activities injurious to 
Britain’s commerce including manufacturing.88  
After the end of the war, Americans expected to return as 
participants in the British system, and were thunderstruck by the 
British Order in Council of July 2, 1783, excluding Americans from 
their most lucrative trade in the British Caribbean.89 When their main 
market was taken away for earning specie to pay for the flood of 
British manufactured imports that entered the country the moment 
hostilities stopped, draining the country within months of specie, and 
exacerbating most of the economic problems of the mid-1780s, 
regaining entry into it became the single most important commercial 
goal of American leaders. This culminated in the grant of the power 
over commerce in the Constitution, buttressed by federal controls on 
state import and export duties, state inspection and tonnage duties 
and laws, and other provisions, precisely to create a single American 
market as a bargaining chip with Britain for re-entry into the 
Caribbean.90  
The Framers spoke knowledgeably of the balance of trade,91 bills 
of exchange,92 of a bank,93 and of passing export taxes onto foreign 
customers by placing them on goods where demand was high.94 They 
were familiar with the idea central to British commercial dominance 
that manufacturing added value to goods and increased profit in 
trade,95 and with the existence of large factories in Britain. They were 
aware of how technological innovations and draconian laws 
protecting the British woolen industry and especially its technology 
helped Britain grow wealthy by manufacturing and exporting woolen 
and other products to America at prices lower than American-made 
 88. Summarized from BERNHARD KNOLLENBERG, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION: 1759–1766, at 33–34, 157–64 (Bernard W. Sheehan ed., Liberty Fund 2002) 
(1960). 
 89. MATSON & ONUF, supra note 1, at 44. 
 90. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 11, at 50 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
 91. Id. at 54. 
 92. RECORDS, supra note 61, at 447. 
 93. Id. at 616. 
 94. Id. at 306. 
 95. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS at IV.vii.b n.51 (1776) (photo. reprint, R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner eds., 
LibertyClassics 1981) (Oxford Univ. Press 1976). 
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products.96 They understood the differential effects of export and 
import duties on production and consumption of different goods,97 
the difficulties of a shortage of circulating specie, and the costs of 
fluctuation on the value of currency in trade.98 They came from states 
with more or less elaborate systems of inspections of dozens of 
export and some import goods.99 They were presumably familiar with 
their colleague Franklin’s decades old essay on why labor costs were 
high in America,100 read Adam Smith, Sir James Steuart and other 
writers on commerce, including Lord Sheffield’s 1784 Observations 
on the Commerce of the American States.101 The latter book, under 
the rubric of “commerce,” systematically surveyed American trade 
(in the narrow sense), manufacturing and consumption patterns and 
concluded that Britain need not end its exclusion of American trade 
from the Caribbean because its Caribbean colonies could get by 
without American imports, and Britain had little to fear from the 
development of American manufactures. This book incensed 
Madison, and Gouverneur Morris referred to it in Convention.102 
Some of the Framers had heard Tench Coxe’s paper partially 
rebutting Sheffield by brilliantly arguing that labor-saving machinery 
would be the solution to the high cost of American labor, allowing 
the United States to compete with Britain.103 Most of the Framers had 
stood on the banks of the Delaware River on the afternoon of August 
22, 1787 to watch John Fitch propel his steamboat upstream,104 and 
 96. Id. chs. viii–ix; see also RECORDS, supra note 61, at 362 (discussing Thomas 
Fitzsimmons’s reference to Britain’s export taxes on wool which were part of the whole system 
of protecting the British wool industry). In addition, Coxe’s paper at the home of Franklin on 
the eve of the Convention proposed policies to acquire British industrial technology. See Coxe, 
supra note 60. Coxe was one of the Commissioners to the Annapolis Convention of 1786 that 
proposed calling the Philadelphia Convention, so he could be considered a Framer. 
 97. This was a concern throughout the debate over a federal export tax. RECORDS, supra 
note 61, 305–08. 
 98. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 1 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 167 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 99. RECORDS, supra note 61, at 586–89. 
 100. Benjamin Franklin, Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, in THE 
PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 227–34 (Leonard W. Labaree et al. eds., 1961). 
 101. JOHN LORD SHEFFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON THE COMMERCE OF THE AMERICAN 
STATES (photo. reprint, Augustus M. Kelley 1970) (1784).  
 102. RECORDS, supra note 61, at 359–61.  
 103. See COXE, supra note 60. 
 104. JOHN FITCH, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN FITCH 178–79 (Frank D. Prager ed., 
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voted to put the patent clause in the Constitution, so they understood 
the impact of technology on commerce. They clearly had a sense of a 
larger system of production, labor, investment, transportation, capital, 
technology, production, and the sale of goods both within the 
transatlantic region and increasingly among the states, as well as with 
the regulation of this larger system.  
So the evidence is that the Framers did have a sense of what we 
mean by the economy, and it included more than just buying and 
selling.105 The question is, did they have a word for this system? 
In Book IV of The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith called the 
system of regulating the overall production of the wealth of the 
British Empire the “mercantile or commercial system,” and described 
it as broadly covering such means as described above to promote or 
retard or even prohibit aspects of agriculture, mining, fisheries, 
forestry, manufacturing, and transportation, as well as buying and 
selling and any other activity which affected it as the “means by 
which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of 
gold and silver in any country by turning the balance of trade in its 
favour.”106 We believe that the word that American commercial and 
political leaders of the late 1700s had for what would correspond to 
our sense of the economy was the same word that Adam Smith used, 
not surprisingly also the same term the Framers used in the 
Constitution: “commerce.”  
To be sure, there were also major differences between the 
“economy” then and now, and these differences explain at least some 
of the seemingly contradictory evidence for both broad and narrow 
meanings of “commerce.” The American economy of the 1780s was 
a dual economy. On the one hand, the American economy was 
heavily oriented towards transatlantic exports and imports, and 
remained heavily so until the early 1800s. A substantial amount of 
goods, such as salt beef and pork, wheat, barrels, hemp, and other 
products, were produced on a small scale even in rural areas and on 
1976). 
 105. McDonald asserts that a concept of the economy had recently evolved in the late 
eighteenth century, though he does not say what it was called. See NOVUS ORDO, supra note 1, 
at 97. 
 106. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 428–29, 451 (photo. reprint, R. H. Campbell et al. eds., 1981) (1979). 
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the frontier for export to earn specie. At the same time, a sizeable 
amount of manufactured goods were imported and sold even in rural 
areas, so that the growth of the economy and higher levels of 
enjoyment of life depended to a far greater extent than even today on 
foreign trade, primarily on British manufactures paid for by specie 
earned in large part by goods Americans sold to the British 
Caribbean, and by the carrying trade.  
Overseas commerce did not merely make colonial life 
comfortable; it made it possible. Without foreign trade, the 
colonists would have been unable to earn sufficient credits in 
their balance of payments to buy imported goods. Many of the 
immigrants would not have come in the first place, and only a 
few of those who did come would have stayed.107  
The part of the economy that was directed toward earning specie or 
transactions in foreign trade, and to a lesser extent in the then still 
small trade among the states, was called what Smith called it: “the 
commercial system,” or “commerce” in the broad sense, and that is 
what the Framers intended to regulate nationally.  
The part of the economy that was not “commercial” was called 
husbandry, domestic oeconomy, trade, or commerce in their narrow 
sense, wherein most basics of life for most people, even in the cities 
and towns, were produced at home, on the plantation, or very 
nearby—economy in the management of a household sense—and 
bartered or bought and sold using state-issued paper money, 
commodity money, or other money substitutes, because hard 
money—gold, silver coin, British pounds, or letters of credit—was 
chronically scarce or unavailable at all.108 In this sense, the Kennedy-
O’Connor image of a simple, primitive American economy has a real 
basis and corresponds to the Framers’ understanding of the term 
“economy,” but it is not the basis of the power over commerce in the 
Constitution so much as the basis of what was left out of the power 
over commerce. As discussed above, Britain excluded “domestic 
 107. JOHN J. MCCUSKER & RUSSELL R. MENARD, THE ECONOMY OF BRITISH AMERICA 
1607–1789, at 71 (1985) (emphasis added).  
 108. DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN 
AMERICA, at 107–13, 152–65 (1980). 
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oeconomy” from the regulation of commerce, and this term continued 
to be used to refer to activities left to the states.109 To be sure, there 
was no bright line separating these “economies” even then, as the 
discussion above concerning the British Privy Council and the 
affecting commerce test versus domestic police shows, but it was 
perhaps easier then to understand the difference by seeing if the 
activity was directed toward large-scale trade or earning scarce 
specie. Over the centuries, the difference between these two 
economies has largely disappeared, as the household economy has 
largely become absorbed into the commercial economy, and we now 
have an almost fully monetized, global, highly specialized and 
interdependent economy in which virtually all our material needs are 
provided though larger commerce. Thus, the Framers’ “oeconomy” 
has become part of our “economy,” not because of overly broad 
interpretation of the power to regulate commerce, but because of the 
evolution of the subject of regulation itself, commerce. 
VIII. COMMERCE AS THE FRAMERS’ CONCEPT OF “THE ECONOMY” 
In sum, if we accept that the Framers had a concept of the 
economy that they called “commerce” that encompassed buying, 
selling, transportation and production for national gain of specie in 
trade, and substitute this in the Lopez formulation as a rough 
equivalent of the modern meaning of “the economy,” then Lopez 
reduces the power to regulate commerce to less than the power to 
regulate commerce: in the Framers’ words expressing how the 
Framers would understand the Lopez Court’s words, Lopez would 
now read: “those activities inside a state may be regulated under the 
power to regulate commerce which are commercial in nature and 
which truly have an effect on commerce.” Clearly, it is absurd to 
require something that is commercial in nature to also really affect 
itself in order to be regulated under the power over commerce. And if 
we state Lopez in modern terms, it reads: “those activities may be 
 109. For example, “[f]rom this view of the powers delegated to the federal government, it 
will clearly appear, that those exclusively granted to it have no relation to the domestic economy 
of the state.” ST. GEORGE TUCKER, 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 186 (1803) (emphasis 
added). 
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regulated which are economic in nature and which substantially 
affect the economy.” Again, requiring things which are economic in 
nature to also substantially affect the economy in order to apply the 
power to regulate commerce to them reduces the power over 
commerce to less than it is stated to be in the Constitution, because 
things that are economic in nature but which do not substantially (in 
the sense of amply) affect the economy may not be regulated under 
the power to regulate the economy. Either way, Lopez no longer 
suffers from the problem of extending the power over commerce into 
“management of households;” instead, Lopez now suffers the 
opposite problem of reducing the power over commerce to less than 
what the plain words of the Constitution state. As a result, reading 
Lopez as the Framer would read it if “commerce” meant our modern 
sense of “the economy” means that a great many matters that are 
actually commercial in nature could not be regulated under the power 
to regulate commerce, let alone noneconomic matters which 
nonetheless affect commerce.110 
In sum, the “management of a household” meaning of “economy” 
in the Framers’ language and the problem of finding the Framers’ 
word for our modern sense of economy mean either that the Lopez 
majority implicitly adopts Justice Thomas’s narrow version of the 
Framers’ definition of commerce, while not agreeing with him that 
the scope of the power over commerce should be so narrowly limited, 
which the Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy concurrence 
implicitly concedes, or, as we argue, because the Framers intended to 
regulate what we call the economy, that the Lopez holding actually 
restates the power over commerce to be less than the Framers 
intended. And if the Framers did not have a concept for the economy, 
or their term for it was not commerce, then Lopez makes the Court 
the arbiter of the meaning of the term “economic.” This would put 
them perilously close to enforcing their own economic views, as the 
Lochner and Knight Courts were said to have done, and to do this 
without any rationale rooted in the language or understanding of the 
Framers.  
 110. Space also unfortunately prohibits consideration of the “among the states” limitation 
on the power over commerce, but we think that it largely corresponded to whatever was in the 
larger commercial system. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The Lopez holding requiring in-state activities to be economic in 
nature in order to be regulated under the power over commerce 
among the states sets up a confrontation of the language of Lopez 
with the language of the Framers, revealing a massive contradiction 
within the originalist underpinnings of Lopez regarding the regulation 
of commerce. Either the Framers had no concept of an economy in 
the modern sense, in which case Lopez needs to explain why the 
power over commerce may regulate things which are economic in 
nature despite the fact that the Framers had no such idea in mind, and 
why the Court is the body to define what is economic in nature. Or, if 
the Framers did intend the power over commerce to regulate the 
economy in the modern sense of the word, excluding a now almost 
totally disappeared non-commercial sector then called “economy,” 
then the Lopez holding reduces the power over commerce to less than 
the Framers intended, and takes us past the Constitution into the 
direction of the Articles of Confederation. Either way, the Lopez 
holding may hardly claim originalist credentials for its Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. 
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